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1Balancing Performance, Robustness and Flexibility
in Routing Systems
Kin-Wah Kwong, Roch Gue´rin, Fellow, IEEE, Anees Shaikh, Senior Member, IEEE, and Shu Tao, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Modern networks face the challenging task of han-
dling increasingly diverse traffic that is displaying a growing
intolerance to disruptions. This has given rise to many initiatives,
and in this paper we focus on multiple topology routing as the
primary vehicle for meeting those demands. Specifically, we seek
routing solutions capable of not just accommodating different
performance goals, but also preserving them in the presence of
disruptions. The main challenge is computational, i.e., to identify
among the enormous number of possible routing solutions the
one that yields the best compromise between performance and
robustness. This is where our principal contribution lies, as we
expand the definition of critical links – a key concept in improving
the efficiency of routing computation – and develop a precise
methodology to efficiently converge on those solutions. Using this
new methodology, we demonstrate that one can compute routing
solutions that are both flexible in accommodating different
performance requirements and robust in maintaining them in
the presence of failures and traffic fluctuations.
I. INTRODUCTION
IP networks now carry a wide range of traffic with per-
formance needs not always served well by the traditional
“one-size-fits-all” design. When it comes to routing, this has
triggered interest in solutions that compute paths according
to different criteria as exemplified in the Multi-Topology
Routing (MTR) extensions [22], [21]. In contrast to traditional
IP routing, MTR allows multiple weights on each link, and
hence the corresponding routings can be assigned to separate
traffic classes. MTR’s main benefits stem, therefore, from its
ability to route traffic classes independently to meet different
performance goals. This added flexibility can be used to im-
prove service differentiation for multiple performance criteria,
e.g., [13], or achieve fast local rerouting after failures, e.g.,
[12], [1]. As detailed in Section II, each of these issues is
reasonably well understood in isolation. However, the growing
heterogeneity of IP traffic and its increasing sensitivity to
disruptions, many of which can be attributed to routing [19],
make exploring if and how routing can be optimized for
performance and flexibility under both normal and failure
conditions an important question.
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We carry out such an investigation in its most basic setting,
namely that of two independent routings, i.e., Dual Topology
Routing or DTR, with one routing targeting delay and the
other throughput. We assume a well-provisioned network,
where link delay characteristics are the dominant performance
criterion for delay-sensitive traffic, but less so for throughput-
sensitive traffic. Our goal goes beyond optimizing routing
decisions according to each criterion, and extends to making
them robust to failures. In other words, performance alone is
not our sole target, and we are willing to “sacrifice” some
of it in exchange for robustness in the face of common
disruptions, e.g., single link failures1. That such a trade-off
is both attainable and beneficial is known under standard IP
routing [24], [10], [23], [17], but its extension to multiple (two)
routings has to the best of our knowledge not been explored
before. The issue is of importance as although DTR, and more
generally MTR, offer routings capable of meeting different
performance criteria, the growing reliability requirements of
today’s traffic also call for ensuring that these criteria are
still met in the presence of failures. Whether or not this can
be realized is unclear. In particular, combining optimization
criteria across multiple routings can often render a solution
more fragile to small changes in parameters, and therefore
make it less amenable to robust optimization. The lack of prior
works exploring this issue and limited a priori understanding
of the existence and feasibility of practical solutions for
computing robust DTR are what motivated this work.
Furthermore, the additional computation complexity intro-
duced by having multiple interacting routings also makes it
unlikely that standard, or even similar solutions as used for
a single routing, can be readily applied. Computational com-
plexity arises from two main sources, one of which is already
present in standard IP routing (single routing). Specifically,
upon detecting failures, IP routing adjusts its packet forward-
ing decisions, i.e., recomputes shortest paths based on the
configured link weights2, to better redistribute traffic around
the failure. The goal of “robust” routing [24], [10], [23], [17]
is then to identify a single set of link weights that optimizes
this traffic redistribution in all failure scenarios under consid-
eration, as well as under normal operating conditions. This
calls for evaluating each routing solution against all possible
failures. In DTR, this already complex problem is compounded
1Single link failures are among the most frequent and can substantially
impact network performance [19], [11]. They are also typically short enough
not to warrant reconfiguring the network.
2Dynamic adjustment of link weights after a failure, while possible, is
usually avoided as it can further slow-down routing convergence and increase
traffic disruptions.
2because routing solutions now consist of all possible pairs of
routings. The resulting combinatorial explosion makes a direct
approach infeasible even for relatively small networks.
The first contribution of this paper is, therefore, to develop
a computationally efficient, yet accurate, solution. The method
is based on a novel definition of link criticality – a key metric
for assessing the importance of a link to the robustness of
routing solutions. The novelty is not in the concept of link
criticality itself. It had already been proposed and used in the
context of single routing [24], [10], [23], where in spite of
the lower computational complexity, a brute force approach
was still impractical for all but small networks. Instead, the
novelty is in how critical links are identified. Specifically, the
challenge is not so much in realizing that only a small subset
of links may indeed be critical to the robustness of a routing
solution. It is in determining which links actually belong to
that subset. This is where the true challenge lies, and link
criticality alone is not a particularly useful concept unless
accompanied by a specific “identification” methodology. As
a matter of fact, the relative contributions of previous works
that tackled this problem for single routing [24], [10], [23]
were in introducing progressively more accurate identification
schemes. Unfortunately, as discussed in Section IV, those
existing ad-hoc methods all failed to produce consistent results
when applied to DTR. Overcoming this problem called for a
re-evaluation of what it meant for a link to be “critical” and for
devising an explicit and systematic methodology for deriving
the criticality of a link from this basic understanding. The
methodology developed in this paper provides an intuitive and
principled discussion of how critical links should be selected;
one that was not articulated in earlier works. The methodology
is applicable to both single and multiple routings and not
limited to a particular traffic engineering objective. As such,
it can also be used to improve or generalize existing robust
single-routing solutions. This generality is where the paper’s
contribution to the concept of link criticality lies.
In addition to the problem of devising an effective link
criticality metric, another challenge faced in a DTR setting
is that links can exhibit different criticality for each routing.
Characterizing the overall (across both routings) criticality
of a link then calls for “combining” those values so as to
produce a global ordering of critical links. This ordering can
then be used to reduce computational complexity by focusing
on a small subset consisting of only the most critical links.
This is what allows us to then explore the benefits of robust
DTR solutions across a broad range of network topologies and
traffic patterns, and identify when, why and how robust DTR
solutions can help. We also explore the robustness of these
benefits in the face of variations in traffic patterns and against
failure scenarios that differ from those originally anticipated.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II
reviews related works. Section III introduces our model and
problem formulation. Section IV presents the approach used
for identifying critical links and evaluates its effectiveness.
Section V is devoted to demonstrating the benefits of robust
DTR optimization across a broad range of network topologies,
traffic patterns and uncertainties. Section VI concludes the
paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
Previous related works fall in two categories: Works tackling
a similar robust optimization problem in the context of single
routing; and works using MTR for traffic engineering and
improving network robustness by computing multiple routings
that serve as backups in case of failures.
Works from the first category are rooted in earlier efforts for
finding optimal link weight settings in IP networks (shortest
path and destination based), e.g., [8]. Fortz et al. [9] was
the first to consider extending the problem to include ro-
bustness to changes in either network topology (link failures)
or traffic patterns. The work suggested that one could often
mitigate the impact of such changes by adjusting just a few
link weights. Subsequent studies, e.g., [10], [17], [24], [23],
established the feasibility of computing a single set of link
weights that worked well under both normal conditions and
all single link failures. The computational complexity of the
problem was also identified, which led to various versions [10],
[24], [23] of the previously mentioned critical link approach.
These were, however, mostly ad-hoc and did not provide a
principled, systematic investigation of the critical link selection
process. Specifically, Yuan [24] proposed to select critical links
randomly, while Fortz et al. [10] suggested to identify them
based on their impact on network utilization. Sridharan et
al. [23] proposed to use fluctuations in the performance of
routing solutions that emulated link failures as a means for
identifying critical links. Our method is partially inspired by
this last approach, but differs significantly in how it determines
link criticality, in part motivated by the fact that neither it nor
the methods of [10], [24] were found to work well in a DTR
setting (see Section IV-C for details).
In the second category, [1], [12] recently proposed to use
MTR to improve network resiliency. Each routing protects
against certain failure scenarios, with routers switching from
one routing to another upon detecting failures. These works
neither consider MTR as a means to support different traffic
classes, nor do they focus on jointly optimizing routing to
preserve performance across classes in the presence of failures.
The use of MTR for traffic engineering was suggested in [13],
[2]. [13] demonstrated the use of MTR to improve service
differentiation among different traffic classes. [2] suggested
to use MTR to approximate optimal routing by dividing
traffic matrix into smaller “slices”, each routed on a separate
topology.
Another set of tangentially related works are studies on
path restoration and backup routing in MPLS networks, e.g.,
[4]. While those works share the goal of improving network
robustness to failures, the MPLS forwarding paradigm makes
it an altogether different problem.
III. ROBUST OPTIMIZATION MODEL
We model the network as a directed graph G = (V,E), with
node set V and link set E, and with Cl denoting the capacity
of link l ∈ E. The network supports two traffic classes: delay-
and throughput-sensitive. The traffic matrices for the two
classes are RD = [rD (s, t)] and RT = [rT (s, t)], respectively,
3where rD (s, t) and rT (s, t) are the traffic volumes in each
class for source-destination (SD) pair (s, t) ∈ V × V .
Each link l in the network is assigned two weights, WDl
and WTl , for routing delay- and throughput-sensitive traffic,
respectively. Hence, two logical topologies are formed for the
two traffic classes. W :=
⋃
l∈E
{
WDl ,W
T
l
}
denotes a weight
setting for the network. Our goal is to find a W that works
well in both normal (failure-free) and all single link failure
scenarios. Traffic from different classes share link resources,
e.g., through a common FIFO queue at each link, so that they
interact on an equal footing. However, in computing routing
solutions, we give precedence to delay-sensitive traffic because
of its inelastic nature, i.e., we give preference to solutions that
optimize performance for delay-sensitive traffic and among
those seek the ones that yield the best possible performance for
throughput-sensitive traffic (see the discussion and formulation
below for details on how this affects the computation of
routing solutions).
The cost function for delay-sensitive traffic is based on the
notion of Service Level Agreements (SLA’s) [17], typically
defined in the form of an end-to-end delay bound for all SD
pairs, which is particularly meaningful for real-time traffic,
e.g., VoIP [5]. End-to-end delays are computed by summing
the delays of individual links on the path of each SD pair. The
delay Dl on link l is computed as
Dl :=

pl, if xl/Cl ≤ µ (1a)
κ
Cl
(
xl
Cl − xl + 1
)
+ pl, otherwise (1b)
where κ is the average packet size, pl and xl are the propa-
gation delay and the total traffic on link l, respectively3. The
end-to-end delay ξ(s,t) for SD pair (s, t) routed on path P
is then ξ(s,t) =
∑
l∈P Dl. The model assumes that queueing
delay is negligible compared to propagation delay when link
utilization is low (≤ µ) [17]. Hence, at low load, delay-
sensitive traffic selects paths based on propagation delay only,
without discriminating among them based on their utilization.
At high load (> µ), Dl includes queueing delay, with Eq. (1b)
using an M/M/1 model to approximate the average queueing
delay on link l.
The cost function of delay-sensitive traffic for SD pair (s, t)
is then related to both ξ(s,t) and the SLA target delay bound
θ > 0. Specifically, the traffic incurs a cost of 0 when its delay
is below θ, followed by a sharp increase as soon as the delay
exceeds the SLA threshold4. This is expressed as
Λ(s,t) :=
{ 0, ξ(s,t) ≤ θ (2a)
B1 +B2
(
ξ(s,t) − θ
)
, otherwise (2b)
where B1 and B2 are positive parameters that determine the
SLA penalty: B1 is a constant penalty incurred for any SLA
violation, while B2 is a penalty proportional to the delay
in excess of the SLA bound. Without loss of generality,
we choose B1 = 100 and B2 = 1. This cost function
captures the financial penalty commonly associated with SLA
3To prevent discontinuity of xl/(Cl − xl) when xl → Cl, this function
is approximated by a linear function when xl/Cl ≥ 0.99.
4Because SLAs are typically evaluated based on averaging multiple mea-
surements (probes), we use a rather high load threshold of µ = 0.95 in
Section V to ensure that performance degradations are experienced by enough
measurement packets to trigger an SLA violation.
violations, and the fact that many real-time applications exhibit
a threshold-based sensitivity to delay, e.g., VoIP quality is
relatively insensitive to delay as long as it remains below a
certain threshold, but degrades very rapidly beyond that [7].
The overall cost function for delay-sensitive traffic is then
defined as the total penalty imposed because of SLA viola-
tions, i.e., Λ :=
∑
(s,t)∈V×V Λ(s,t).
For throughput-sensitive traffic, we reuse the load-based
cost function f(xl) of [8], where f(xl) denotes the congestion
cost of link l as a function of its total traffic load xl. The
overall cost for throughput-sensitive traffic, Φ, is then the sum
of all link costs, i.e., Φ :=
∑
l∈L f (xl) where L is the set of
links carrying throughput-sensitive traffic.
Based on Λ and Φ, we define a global cost function
K := 〈Λ,Φ〉 as well as an “ordering” that allows us to
compare values K1 and K2 obtained by two routing solutions.
In keeping with the focus on first meeting the requirements of
delay-sensitive traffic, the cost function used to compute rout-
ing solutions reflects a “lexicographic” ordering of the two cost
components, namely, K1 = 〈Λ1,Φ1〉 > K2 = 〈Λ2,Φ2〉, if and
only if Λ1 > Λ2, or Λ1 = Λ2 and Φ1 > Φ2. In other words,
a routing is better only if it improves delay-sensitive traffic
performance, or if it keeps delay-sensitive traffic performance
essentially the same but improves throughput-sensitive traffic
performance. Next, given K and the associated ordering, we
search for weight settings W that work well in both normal
and failure scenarios.
This search proceeds in two phases. The first phase, called
regular optimization, targets normal conditions and minimizes
Knormal := 〈Λnormal,Φnormal〉, where Λnormal and Φnormal are
respectively the delay- and throughput-sensitive traffic costs in
the absence of failures. In other words, the first phase seeks
to
minimize
W
Knormal . (3)
The best costs Λ∗normal and Φ
∗
normal obtained from this first phase
are then used as benchmarks when optimizing for robustness
in the second phase.
The second phase, called robust optimization, optimizes
routing against link failures. Let Λfail,l and Φfail,l denote the
costs of the delay- and throughput-sensitive traffic, respec-
tively, when link l fails. To make routing robust against all
single link failures, we search for weight settings as follows:
minimize
W
Kfail := 〈Λfail,Φfail〉 (4)
subject to
Λnormal = Λ∗normal (5)
Φnormal ≤ (1 + χ)Φ∗normal (6)
where Λfail :=
∑
l∈E Λfail,l and Φfail :=
∑
l∈E Φfail,l measure
the compounded costs of the delay- and throughput-sensitive
traffic, respectively, over all single link failures5.
Eq. (5) states that we are not willing to degrade the
performance of delay-sensitive traffic, i.e., allow SLA viola-
tions in exchange for greater robustness, because applications
associated with this traffic class experience sharp quality
degradations when the end-to-end delay violates the target
5Other cost objectives can be used as well.
4SLA bound. On the other hand, Eq. (6) states that such a
trade-off is acceptable for throughput-sensitive traffic within a
range specified by χ ≥ 0, because this traffic class is typically
associated with elastic (e.g., TCP-based) applications that can
tolerate some degradations.
IV. REDUCING COMPUTATIONAL COSTS
The problem of computing optimal link weights in IP net-
works (even with a single traffic class and without optimizing
for failure resiliency) is NP-hard [8]. Finding an exact solution
to Eq. (3) that optimizes DTR under normal conditions is
already a computationally formidable task, because the so-
lution space is now exponentially larger6. Finding a solution
to Eq. (4), which considers the impact of all possible single
link failures, is even harder. Hence, computationally efficient
heuristics are needed to make robust DTR optimization prac-
tical. This is the goal of this section.
A. Heuristic outline
As discussed in Section III, our approach involves two
phases illustrated in Fig. 1. The first phase builds on a local
search heuristic to identify a good DTR link weight setting
for Eq. (3), while the second phase focuses on finding a good
robust routing solution that optimizes Eq. (4).
During the search of Phase 1, both weights (one for each
traffic class) on each link are randomly perturbed. A new
weight setting is accepted if it results in a lower network cost
Knormal. This procedure is repeated across all links during each
iteration, and stops7 when the resulting cost reductions are
less than c% after P1 diversifications, where a diversification
consists of restarting the search from a new random weight
setting whenever the cost is not improved after a certain
number of iterations. Following the motivations put forth
in [23] and as detailed in Section IV-D1, we leverage Phase 1a
to collect statistics on the impact of each link on the cost
functions. This information will be used in Phase 1c to identify
critical links. As detailed in Section IV-D1, Phase 1b may also
be triggered by the heuristic to generate additional statistics if
the information collected in Phase 1a is insufficient as required
by the critical link identification process.
Critical links are used in Phase 2 of the heuristic, which
relies on the weight settings produced during Phase 1. In par-
ticular, weight settings were recorded during Phase 1 each time
one was found that satisfied the constraints of Eqs. (5) and (6).
Starting from those weight settings, Phase 2 performs another
local search to optimize Eq. (4). The search again terminates
when cost reductions from new weight perturbations are less
than c% after at least P2 diversifications. The weight setting
W that results in the smallest value for Kfail is chosen as the
final solution. The complete pseudocode for the heuristic can
be found in [15].
6Because traffic from the two classes interact (through a common FIFO
queue in the setting chosen for this paper), they affect each other’s perfor-
mance. Therefore, the routing choices for the two traffic classes also affect
each other. As a result, each routing for one class needs to in principle be
evaluated for all possible routings of the other class. Hence, the solution space
grows exponentially.
7We implicitly assume that Phase 1 produces a good enough solution when
its stopping criterion is met.
If cost statistics is not enough, 
generate statistics until enough
Optimize normal network performance
and collect cost statistics
Optimize network robustness
Finish
Input traffic engineering instance
Phase 1a
Phase 1
Identify critical link set
Phase 1b
Phase 1c
Phase 2
Fig. 1. The flow of the proposed heuristic.
B. Critical links
The major complexity of the heuristic is in Phase 2, since
each step involves computing network costs for all possible
link failures. As in [24], [10], [23], this is what motivates the
introduction of critical links, as once they have been identified,
Kfail only needs to be evaluated for the failure of these links,
instead of all links. The resulting reduction in computations is
then in direct proportion to |Ec| /|E|, where Ec ⊂ E denotes
the set of critical links. The smaller |Ec|, the greater the
savings, and the optimization now becomes
minimize
W
K fail :=
〈
Λfail,Φfail
〉
(7)
where Λfail :=
∑
l∈Ec Λfail,l and Φfail :=
∑
l∈Ec Φfail,l.
Given this, our goals are two-fold. For a given value of
|Ec|, we want to explicitly identify which links to include in
Ec to minimize the resulting inaccuracy. In addition, we would
like to develop an understanding of how small |Ec| can be in
practice, while preserving acceptable accuracy.
C. Defining link criticality
Identifying critical links, i.e., quantifying the criticality of
a link, is an issue that earlier proposals [24], [10], [23] have
tackled. Unfortunately, extending earlier approaches to DTR
failed to generate quality solutions, and we briefly review the
reasons behind this failure.
The introduction of two interacting routings as part of DTR
resulted in an explosion in the size of the solution space. This
made the random selection approach of [24] impractical. This
was also an issue with the load-based criterion of [10], as the
presence of two routings can result in a much wider range of
load variations across routing solutions. In addition, link load
is not the only or even the most critical performance metric for
delay-sensitive traffic, which is one of the two traffic classes
in our DTR model.
The reasons behind the failure of the approach of [23]
in a DTR setting are more subtle. In [23], critical links are
defined as links for which network costs vary wildly, when
evaluated after link weight perturbations that emulate failures
(assign large values to the link) during the initial phase of
the optimization (our Phase 1a). The intuition is that the
wide cost fluctuations these links produce across failure-like
weight settings, identify links for which selecting the “right”
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Fig. 2. (a) Defining link criticality. (b) Two link cost distributions.
weights can make a significant difference. In translating this
intuition into a procedure, [23] introduces two thresholds,
which define regions of bad and good performance, and tracks
how often they are crossed for each link across instances
(weight settings) that emulate the failure of that link. The
problem with extending this approach to DTR is that the
greater range of performance variations present in DTR makes
it difficult to define thresholds that are universally effective
across network settings. In addition, because [23] is only
concerned with a single routing, its methodology does not
deal with reconciling different link criticalities, one for each
routing.
Our failure to extend earlier definitions of link criticality to
a DTR setting motivated a re-examination of what was behind
the very notion of link criticality, and a search for a more
systematic procedure to quantify it.
Specifically, we define the “criticality” of a link as the differ-
ence in the network costs produced by Phase 2 of our heuristic,
with and without including the link. Thus, the question is how
to estimate this difference without computing the best network
cost if the link were included in the computation. For that
purpose, let us hypothetically assume (see Fig. 2(a)) that we
can construct the distribution of network costs, i.e., Λfail,l or
Φfail,l, under all “acceptable” routing solutions8 when link l
fails. Assuming the availability of this distribution, it is then
possible to infer the likely effect of including link l or not in
Ec, as we describe next.
Consider first the case where link l is not in Ec. In such case,
because the procedure of selecting link weights is oblivious
to network performance under the failure of link l, our best
estimate for the resulting network cost is simply the mean of
the distribution of Fig. 2(a). In other words, the final weight
setting is essentially random when it comes to the failure of
link l. In contrast, when link l is in Ec, the impact of its failure
is explicitly incorporated in the weight selection. Hence, the
selection process is biased against weight settings that generate
high network costs when link l fails (the r.h.s. of the curve
in Fig. 2(a)), and favors weight settings that yield good
performance (the l.h.s. of the curve in Fig. 2(a)). Choosing the
weight setting that produces the best such performance may
not be feasible, since the final solution has to be a compromise
across all failure scenarios. However, it is reasonable to assume
that the final choice falls somewhere in the “left-tail” of the
distribution.
8A routing is acceptable if it satisfies Eqs. (5) and (6).
Based on the above observations, we propose to define link
criticality as the difference between the mean value of network
costs when link l fails, and some estimate of the left-tail of
this distribution. More formally, let Λ̂fail,l and Φ̂fail,l denote the
mean values of the distribution of Fig. 2(a) for the delay and
throughput-sensitive cost functions, and Λ˜fail,l and Φ˜fail,l the
corresponding left-tail9 mean values, we define the criticality
of link l for the two traffic classes as:
ρΛ,l := Λ̂fail,l − Λ˜fail,l (8)
ρΦ,l := Φ̂fail,l − Φ˜fail,l (9)
The higher the value of ρΛ,l or ρΦ,l, the more critical
link l is. Fig. 2(b) shows two representative distributions
for links l and l′. The network cost distribution for link l′
is relatively narrow, so that its mean and left-tail mean are
close to each other. This indicates that even if we do not
explicitly take link l′ into account during robust optimization,
our selection of a routing solution, which is essentially random
in its performance under the failure of link l′, will not perform
too differently from one optimized for such a scenario. In
contrast, the wider distribution for link l translates into a much
bigger difference between a random weight selection and one
that explicitly seeks to optimize performance under the failure
of link l.
D. Identifying critical links
In order to use our proposed definition of link criticality,
we need to return to our initial hypothesis and validate it,
i.e., obtain estimates of the distributions of network costs
following the failure of each link across all acceptable routings
(link weight settings). Obviously, this needs to be done at
an acceptable computational cost. The approach we use is
inspired from the methodology of [23], and extends it to reflect
the larger solution space of DTR.
1) Building cost distributions: A naı¨ve approach to building
the cost distribution we seek would be to consider a very
large set of weight settings, large enough to yield a reasonable
sampling of the underlying distribution, and to proceed to then
fail every link in succession and compute the resulting network
costs. Clearly, this is not computationally feasible. Instead, as
in [23], we take advantage of the fact that robust optimization
first needs to compute the best network cost under normal
conditions. This is Phase 1a in Fig. 1, which performs a local
search that randomly perturbs individual link weights while
seeking to improve network cost. The information gathered
in this phase can be leveraged to build the distribution of
network costs under link failures. This is because some weight
perturbations closely resemble link failures, i.e., assigning a
large enough weight to a link has a similar impact on routing
decisions as failing the link (the latter is equivalent to assigning
it an “infinite” weight).
Specifically, cost estimates are recorded for every Phase 1a
weight perturbation for which the values of both perturbed link
weights are in the interval [qwmax, wmax], where 0 < q < 1 and
wmax is the maximum allowable weight value (this emulates
the failure of the link and affects both traffic classes), and the
9We define the left-tail as the smallest 10% costs.
6network costs before such perturbation are “acceptable.” We
set q = 0.7 to realize a reasonable trade-off between closely
emulating failures and ensuring a large enough number of
failure-like perturbations by the end of Phase 1a. The focus
on acceptable network costs is because the cost distribution
we seek to estimate is in fact a conditional distribution, where
the conditioning is that the original network cost be within
a certain range of the optimal values, i.e., as captured by
Eqs. (5) and (6). These represent the only weight settings we
are willing to consider, and therefore the one to focus on when
seeking to identify critical links.
In practice, the criteria used to decide whether a perturbation
is acceptable or not is slightly looser than the conditions
expressed in Eqs. (5) and (6). This relaxation is to ensure
that we collect a reasonable number of cost samples during
Phase 1a. Specifically, samples are deemed acceptable as long
as the cost of delay-sensitive traffic does not exceed the current
best cost (discovered in Phase 1a so far) by more than zB1
(0 ≤ z ≤ 1 and recall from Eq. (2b) that B1 is a fixed
cost penalty imposed on each SLA violation), and the cost
of throughput-sensitive traffic is less than (1 + χ) times the
current best cost, where χ is the same relaxation parameter as
in Eq. (6). In our experiments, we use z = 0.5 and χ = 0.2.
Pseudocode detailing the collection of cost samples during
Phase 1a can be found in [15].
Even with the above relaxations of our sampling strategy, it
is still possible that the number of valid samples generated in
Phase 1a is insufficient to produce accurate estimates of the
cost distributions of all links. This is because it requires weight
perturbations that result in both weights being close to wmax.
Too few samples would produce inaccurate cost distributions,
which could result in incorrect assessment of link criticality
and compromise the quality of the final routing solution. Our
approach to this problem is to add an optional phase, Phase 1b,
that is carried out in case insufficient samples are collected in
Phase 1a. Whether or not to trigger Phase 1b depends on the
following considerations.
In Phase 1a, we continuously update the criticality of each
link for the two traffic classes using the cost samples collected
so far (based on Eqs. (8) and (9)), and maintain these values
in two lists (EΛ and EΦ) sorted in descending order. EΛ and
EΦ are updated when on average τ (we set τ = 30) additional
cost samples per link are collected. After each update, we
evaluate changes in the rank order of the criticality of all links
as follows.
Let us take EΛ as an example. Between two updates at t−1
and t, we evaluate the following index for link l: SΛ,l (t) :=
|RankΛ (l, t)− RankΛ (l, t− 1)| where RankΛ (l, t) denotes its
rank in EΛ(t). Then, we evaluate the overall change SΛ of crit-
icality index for delay-sensitive traffic: SΛ :=
∑
l∈E γlSΛ,l (t)
where γl is a weighing factor satisfying
∑
l∈E γl = 1. We
choose γl ∝ SΛ,l (t) to ensure that greater weight is given to
links whose criticality rank changes more. Similarly, SΦ for
throughput-sensitive traffic is defined accordingly. Given SΛ
and SΦ as defined, we consider that link criticality estimates
have converged if both SΛ ≤ e and SΦ ≤ e. In the evaluation
of Section IV-E, we use e = 2 as our convergence threshold.
If by the end of Phase 1a, convergence conditions are not
Algorithm 1: Critical link identification process.
Input: Sorted EΛ and EΦ, target size n of critical link set
Result: Critical link set Ec
n1 ← |E|, n2 ← |E|, Ec := EΛ,n1 ∪ EΦ,n21
while |Ec| > n do2
if ρΛ (EΛ,n1−1) ≥ ρΦ (EΦ,n2−1) then n2 ← n2 − 13
else n1 ← n1 − 14
end5
return Ec := EΛ,n1 ∪ EΦ,n26
satisfied, Phase 1b is initiated (see Fig. 1). Its purpose is to
generate additional samples until convergence has been real-
ized. Phase 1b obviously entails some computational overhead.
However, as demonstrated in Section IV-E, this overhead (and
that associated with the gathering of samples during Phase 1a)
pales in comparison to the computational cost of Phase 2.
Additional details about Phase 1b can again be found in [15].
2) Selecting critical links: After Phase 1a or 1b, the quanti-
ties ρΛ,l and ρΦ,l, defined in Eqs. (8) and (9) as the criticality
of link l for the two cost functions, have been estimated. It
remains to use this information to decide which links belong
to Ec. This depends on ρΛ,l and ρΦ,l as well as the target size
n of Ec, and is carried out in Phase 1c. Because each link
has two distinct criticality values, one for each traffic type,
their orderings according to each may not be consistent. As a
result, the first step of Phase 1c is to normalize link criticality
values as follows:
ρΛ,l := ρΛ,l
/∑
j∈E Λ˜fail,j , ρΦ,l := ρΦ,l
/∑
j∈E Φ˜fail,j
Note that the denominators in the expressions for ρΛ,l and
ρΦ,l represent lower bound estimates
10 of the network costs
that any routing may be able to realize across all single link
failures. The estimates are lower bounds as the best cost
values achievable for each individual link failure may not be
jointly realizable. Finding a routing capable of approaching
those values is our goal, and doing so at an acceptable
computational cost is the purpose behind identifying critical
links. The quantities ρΛ,l and ρΦ,l normalize the absolute
criticality values for link l, ρΛ,l and ρΦ,l, so that it is then
possible to rank links according to a global notion of criticality
that accounts for both traffic classes.
Specifically, ρΛ,l and ρΦ,l capture relative deviations in-
curred, for each traffic type, when link l is not included in
Ec. With these normalized criticality values in hand, Phase 1c
proceeds to progressively eliminate links that have the least
effect on the expected, normalized error of the optimization
procedure. Specifically, links are first sorted in descending
order of ρΛ,l and ρΦ,l into two lists, EΛ and EΦ, respec-
tively. The two lists are then used to estimate the normalized
optimization errors, if only the top-m links in a list are used
in Phase 2 of the heuristic. These expected normalized errors
are computed as follows:
ρΛ (EΛ,m) :=
∑
l∈E\EΛ,m
ρΛ,l , ρΦ (EΦ,m) :=
∑
l∈E\EΦ,m
ρΦ,l
where EΛ,m ⊆ EΛ and EΦ,m ⊆ EΦ denote the sets of the
10Recall that Λ˜fail,j and Φ˜fail,j represent estimates of the best possible
network costs after the failure of link j.
7TABLE I
CRITICAL VS. FULL SEARCH FOR DIFFERENT TOPOLOGIES.
Topology type [# nodes, # links] RandTopo [30,180] NearTopo [30,180] PLTopo [30,162] ISP [16,70]
Average link utilization 0.43 0.46 0.44 0.43
βfull 0.19 21.39 1.13 1.04
|Ec|
|E| = 5%
βcrt 2.60 (0.82) 25.17 (5.73) 2.82 (0.28) 3.32 (0.74)
βΦ (%) 7.96 (8.71) 24.55 (10.56) 3.11 (2.28) 14.22 (8.27)
|Ec|
|E| = 10%
βcrt 1.30 (0.35) 25.31 (3.10) 2.40 (0.13) 3.22 (0.93)
βΦ (%) 4.09 (0.32) 18.59 (13.81) 5.61 (3.07) 18.01 (6.22)
|Ec|
|E| = 15%
βcrt 0.99 (0.15) 22.33 (4.55) 1.76 (0.21) 1.99 (0.35)
βΦ (%) 2.75 (1.84) 19.42 (13.75) 8.03 (4.19) 10.08 (4.43)
top-m links, in order of criticality, in EΛ and EΦ. Given these
estimates, Ec is initialized to E and links are removed in
reverse order of their effect on the normalized errors. This
elimination process ends when the target size of |Ec| = n is
reached. The full procedure is detailed in Algorithm 1.
E. Evaluating critical link selection
In this section, we demonstrate that the approach we have
just described (denoted critical search) is successful in meet-
ing our original goals, which we quantify by comparing it to
a “brute-force” solution with Ec = E (termed full search)
in terms of both its accuracy and computational cost. The
evaluation is carried out over a range of topologies and traffic
loads (see Section V-A for details). Experiments are repeated 5
times for each network topology and traffic load configuration,
and averages and standard deviations are reported.
1) Accuracy: To measure the accuracy of the critical search
solution, we introduce the following metrics:
• βfull, βcrt: Average numbers of SD pairs that violate the
SLA delay bound across all single link failures, under
full (full) and critical searches (crt).
• βΦ (%): Difference in network costs for throughput-
sensitive traffic (Φfail) between full and crt11.
A good solution satisfies βcrt ≈ βfull and βΦ ≈ 0.
The performance of critical search is summarized in Table I
for different network topologies and different |Ec| values that
vary from 5% to 15% of |E| (the values in brackets denote the
standard deviations across the 5 runs of each experiment). The
results demonstrate that critical search consistently produces
a reasonable approximation of full search across different
topologies, while considering only a small, albeit carefully
selected, number of links. Similar results were obtained for
different network sizes.
Another parameter, besides topology, that can influence the
accuracy of critical search is network load. We investigate its
impact in the context of a random topology with 30 nodes
and 180 links. We set the maximum link utilization to 0.9
(the average utilization is 0.56, up from 0.43 in Table I).
The results are as follows. βfull is 1.80. βcrt [resp. βΦ (%)]
is 5.77 [18.43], 2.23 [22.90], and 2.19 [24.98] when |Ec|/|E|
is 10%, 20%, and 25% respectively. The results illustrate that
good accuracy can still be realized with only a slightly larger
number of links (≈ 20% vs. 10∼15%) now in Ec. The impact
of higher network load can be explained as follows. At high
11Critical search may produce a smaller cost for throughput-sensitive traffic
than full search does, because of the non-linearity of the lexicographic cost
function.
loads, the delay-sensitive traffic becomes more sensitive to
queueing delays because of congestion. This amplifies the
errors made by overlooking the cost impact of certain links.
Similarly, the slope of the cost function of throughput-sensitive
traffic increases with network load, so that at high loads a
slight change in link load can significantly affect the cost.
This in turn amplifies the magnitude of the errors incurred
when omitting some links from the optimization. Both of those
factors point to the need for some increase in the size of Ec
to maintain the accuracy of the critical search.
2) Computational savings: The other important aspect of
critical search is the magnitude of the computational savings
it yields. As discussed in Section IV-B, the bulk of the
savings comes from reducing the time spent in Phase 2,
and their magnitude should be approximately proportional to
1 − |Ec|/|E|. For illustration purposes, we show results for
a 30-node, 240-link RandTopo when |Ec|/|E| = 0.1. The
average computation times (in hours) for the critical [resp. full]
search in Phases 1 and 2 are 1.80 [1.32] and 4.27 [56.05]
respectively. The results show that while the critical search
approach slightly increases the time spent in Phase 1, this
increase pales in comparison to the reduction of time spent in
Phase 2. The results show a reduction in computation time
from several days for the full search down to just a few
hours for the critical search. These results were obtained on
a 2.66 GHz Pentium Xeon machine, and all our experiments
did not require more than 100 MB of memory.
In summary, in situations where computation time is not
an issue, e.g., small networks, access to substantial compu-
tational resources and/or loose time constraints for produc-
ing a solution, a full search is the approach of choice as
it provides the highest accuracy. However, there are many
settings where a full search will be either impractical or too
expensive, especially because complexity grows very rapidly
with network size. For example, extrapolating from the above
results of computation times, a full search on a well-connected
100-node network will likely take several weeks versus about
a day when using the critical link approach. Granted, those
figures assume relatively low-end computational resources,
but even in instances where more resources are available,
both computational time and computational costs are likely
to remain an issue. Network optimization may not be con-
tinuously performed in real-time, but new technologies, e.g.,
virtualization, have considerably shortened the duration of
provisioning cycles. Similarly, recent trends such as cloud
computing have made computations more akin traditional
utilities, where cost and consumption are closely linked. As
8a result, a solution that offers a tunable (through varying the
size of the critical link set) trade-off between computational
cost and accuracy is a useful tool.
V. EVALUATING ROBUSTNESS
The previous section addressed the feasibility of computing
routing solutions capable of meeting delay and throughput
requirements and maintaining them in the presence of all
single link failures. Next, we turn to exploring the merits
of this solution, and in particular assessing when it is of
benefit, and how big those benefits are. Answering those
questions calls for comparing the performance of routing
solutions computed with and without taking robustness into
account across different network topologies of varying sizes
and carrying different traffic patterns and loads. Additionally,
the choice of SLA target is also of interest, e.g., to determine
whether simply relaxing the target SLA can substitute for a
robust routing solution.
Last but not least, the sensitivity of the solution to the
assumptions on which it is predicated is of concern. In
particular, we examine the sensitivity of robust routing so-
lutions along two dimensions. The first one is inaccuracy in
the “anticipated” traffic matrices used in computing a robust
routing solution. Such inaccuracy is to be expected since traffic
matrix estimation is rife with approximations, e.g., [16]. The
second dimension along which we assess the sensitivity of
robust routing solutions is that of failure patterns. Specifically,
routing solutions are computed to ensure robustness in the
face of all single link failures, as such failures are more
common. However, they are clearly not the only possible
failure scenarios, and it is important to ensure that robustness
to those failures is not at the cost of increased fragility to
other types of failures. For illustration purposes, we focus on
another important class of failures, namely, node failures that
can arise because of software bugs or overload that affect an
entire router.
In the rest of this section, we attempt to answer these
questions, starting with an overview of the configurations
(network topologies, traffic matrices, and other parameter
settings) used in the evaluation. The results of the investigation
can be summarized as follows:
• Robust optimization affords significant benefits across
most network topologies, i.e., minor loss in performance
under normal conditions and much smaller performance
degradations in the presence of failures.
– These benefits grow as the path diversity (i.e., the
number of paths between nodes) offered by the network
topology increases. This is because robust optimization
explores additional paths besides the “shortest paths”
considered by regular optimization. Those additional
paths are then evaluated to determine if they afford
greater robustness without meaningfully degrading per-
formance under normal conditions. The range of this
exploration is obviously bound by the number of
alternate paths that are available. Hence, the benefits
that robust optimization can offer, are typically in
proportion to the number of paths it can explore.
• Network size and load do not significantly affect the
benefits of robust optimization.
– However, because high network loads can limit path
diversity (i.e., by reducing the number of paths that
can accommodate delay-sensitive traffic without SLA
violations after a failure), those benefits are somewhat
lower at very high loads.
• Relaxing SLA delay bounds is not a substitute for robust
optimization, i.e., a looser SLA does not ensure greater
robustness to failures.
• The benefits of using robust optimization are not overly
sensitive to variations in the assumptions used to compute
a solution. In particular, they remain even in the presence
of variations in traffic patterns and loads, and for different
types of failures, e.g., link or node failures.
A. Evaluation settings
1) Network topologies: Both real and synthesized topolo-
gies are used. Our real topology emulates a North Ameri-
can ISP backbone network of 16 nodes and 70 links. For
synthesized topologies, we assume that nodes are randomly
distributed in a unit square and connected using three different
types of topologies:
• RandTopo: Random graph of given average node degree.
• NearTopo: Nodes connect to their closest neighbors.
• PLTopo: Power-law topology based on [3].
For synthesized topologies, link propagation delays are deter-
mined by the Euclidean distances between nodes and scaled
proportionally to ensure a reasonable match between the
target SLA bound θ and the network diameter. For the real
ISP topology, link propagation delays are determined by the
geographical distances between nodes. In both synthesized and
real topologies, link propagation delays ranged roughly from
5ms to 20ms. Unless otherwise specified, a value of θ=25ms is
used, which approximates the U.S. coast-to-coast propagation
delay. Link capacities were set at 500 Mbps, with different
traffic patterns and intensities (see below) used to generate
heterogeneous load levels.
2) Traffic matrices: The throughput- and delay-sensitive
traffic matrices are generated using the models as in [13],
where we assume that each SD pair generates delay-sensitive
traffic. We assume that the total volume of delay-sensitive traf-
fic is 30% of the total network traffic volume, but experiments
with other fractions did not reveal strong sensitivity to this
value. This is because both traffic classes share a common
FIFO queue in the network, so that total load rather than
the fraction of traffic from a given class determines queueing
delays. Furthermore, as reflected in the cost function used
for delay-sensitive traffic, propagation delay is the dominant
component in determining its performance.
3) Computational parameters: Both the cost functions and
the computational method of Section IV involve a number
of parameters, and we briefly specify the values used in
generating the results of Sections V-B to V-F. Experiments
with other values produced some changes in the results,
but none that significantly affected the conclusions of this
investigation.
9TABLE II
NUMBER OF SLA VIOLATIONS ACROSS TOPOLOGIES.
Topology type [# nodes, # links] RandTopo [30,180] NearTopo [30,180] PLTopo [30,162] ISP [16,70]
Average SLA violations Robust 0.99 (0.15) 22.33 (4.55) 1.76 (0.21) 1.99 (0.35)No robust 23.32 (8.07) 40.17 (4.74) 11.25 (2.05) 4.49 (0.64)
Average top-10% SLA violations Robust 5.92 (0.70) 121.81 (22.46) 10.85 (1.81) 10.93 (2.74)No robust 139.01 (27.28) 180.25 (25.20) 72.58 (16.33) 23.62 (3.17)
Cost degradation of throughput-sensitive traffic (%) 6.02 (1.45) 18.93 (2.06) 7.01 (1.61) 12.35 (4.35)
In estimating the network cost for delay-sensitive traffic,
we used a packet size κ = 1500 bytes and a load threshold
µ = 0.95 in Eq. (1). This value of load threshold was used
because we consider a backbone environment, where high
link speeds make queueing delays negligible except at very
high loads as reported in [20]. A similar assumption was also
used in an earlier related work [17]. For example, given our
setting, a 95% link load corresponds to an average queueing
delay of less than 0.5ms which is about 10 times less than the
smallest link propagation delay in our experiments. In allowing
degradation of the performance experienced by throughput-
sensitive traffic in exchange for greater robustness, we chose
χ = 0.2, i.e., we allow a degradation of up to 20%. In Phase 1a
of the optimization heuristic, the diversification interval is
set to 100 iterations and the search stops when P1 = 20
diversifications have all produced cost improvements below
c = 0.1%. In Phase 2, each diversification round starts with a
weight setting close to one that already satisfies the constraints
of Eqs. (5) and (6), so a smaller diversification interval of 30
iterations is used and the search terminates after P2 = 10
diversifications produce cost improvements below c = 0.1%.
Unless otherwise specified, |Ec|/|E| = 0.15 was used. Each
experiment was repeated 5 times and the average results are
reported. In the tables, the values in the brackets denote the
standard deviations in the 5 runs of each experiment.
B. Effect of network topology
We evaluate the benefits of robust optimization across the
topologies of Section V-A1. Two metrics of interest are (i)
the number of SLA violations in the presence of failures
(as a measure of robustness); and (ii) the impact of robust
optimization on the network cost of throughput-sensitive traffic
(as a measure of the cost of robust optimization). Note that
implicit in our earlier choice of χ = 0.2, we are willing to
tolerate an increase in the network cost of throughput-sensitive
traffic of 20% in exchange for robustness. The purpose of (ii)
is to accurately ascertain the extent of the penalty that robust
optimization imposes on throughput-sensitive traffic (recall
that we are giving precedence to delay-sensitive traffic in the
optimization).
The results of this investigation for metric (i) are reported
in Table II, for scenarios where all topologies had an average
link load around 0.43 under normal conditions. We note that
the tables report the absolute number of SLA violations in
each configuration. Because larger topologies (more nodes)
have more SD pairs over which SLAs are measured12, they
often give rise to more SLA violations. This is in spite of
12The number of delay-sensitive SD pairs in a network with |V | nodes is
|V | (|V | − 1).
the fact that a larger number of nodes typically improves path
diversity, which can benefit robust optimization. The benefits
from the latter can be readily assessed by dividing the number
of SLA violations by the number of SD pairs to obtain a
relative number of violations. From the table, we see that on
average, robust optimization not only produces substantially
fewer SLA violations across all failures (by factors ranging
from 2 to 7 in most cases13), but more importantly it yields
meaningful reductions when focusing on the “worst” top-10%
of all failures, i.e., those with the highest number of SLA
violations.
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Fig. 3. Network performance with and without robust optimization.
We take a closer look at how those benefits are achieved in
the case of RandTopo, for which detailed link-by-link results
are presented in Fig. 3 that reports on both metrics (i) and
(ii). Fig. 3(a) displays the often dramatic reduction in the
number of SLA violations that robust optimization affords,
while Fig. 3(b) illustrates that throughput-sensitive traffic is
also afforded some protection, especially during the worst
failure patterns. In addition, the last row of Table II shows
that although we were willing to tolerate a degradation of
up to 20% in the cost of throughput-sensitive traffic under
normal conditions in exchange for greater robustness, the
actual degradation incurred is typically much smaller. In other
words, the use of sub-optimal and potentially longer paths
selected by robust optimization only had a small impact on the
performance of throughput-sensitive traffic. This observation
was consistent across all our experiments, so that from now
on we focus on metric (i).
We turn next to NearTopo that was identified as somewhat
of an outlier exhibiting smaller benefits from robust opti-
mization than other topologies. Specifically, Table II shows
a relatively large number of SLA violations even under robust
optimization. This can be explained as follows: In NearTopo,
nodes connect only to their nearest neighbors. Paths between
pairs of nodes geographically far apart, e.g., at opposite sides
of the network, are not only long (in terms of hop counts),
13NearTopo is somewhat of an outlier in that even if some reductions
are seen, the number of SLA violations remains high even with robust
optimization. We will shortly explain the reason behind this behavior.
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but share a small set of links in the “core” of the network.
This limited path diversity means that core links are typically
heavily loaded, and the associated long queueing delays can
then induce SLA violations even in the absence of failures.
Failures obviously make matters worse, and whenever a core
link fails, its traffic can only be redistributed on few other
links that are already heavily loaded. This translates into even
heavier congestion and longer queueing delays on those links,
which then result in a large number of SLA violations. An
obvious question is whether robust optimization would fare
better, if links in the core of the network were resized to
eliminate SLA violations at least under normal conditions.
The resizing was done by increasing the capacity of those
congested links so as to bring down their utilization below 90%
under normal conditions. After performing such link resizing,
the average number of SLA violations after failures decreases
as expected (down to 8 when robust optimization is used and
18 when it is not). However, the marginal path diversity that
is still the rule in NearTopo implies that even then the benefits
of robust optimization remain limited.
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Fig. 4. Link loads after failure under robust optimization. (a) Number of
links experiencing load increase. (b) Average increase in link load.
The investigation of NearTopo illustrates that in general the
benefits of robust optimization depend on its ability to discover
and use additional paths that regular optimization would not
consider, and do so without inducing severe congestion on
these paths. This is not possible in NearTopo, where the
limited number of routing options in the core means that both
regular and robust optimizations consider essentially the same
set of paths. To further illustrate the effect of path diversity
on robust optimization, we compare link utilization levels in
RandTopo and NearTopo after failures. Fig. 4(a) shows that
in RandTopo load increases after a failure are distributed over
a much greater number of links than in NearTopo, Fig. 4(b)
shows that the magnitudes of these increases are much smaller
in RandTopo. The few large utilization increases in NearTopo
are responsible for the comparatively larger number of SLA
violations it experiences.
C. Effect of network size
Network size is another factor that can affect the benefits
of robust optimization, because varying the number of either
nodes or links can affect the level of path diversity in the
network (i.e., the number of available paths between nodes). In
investigating this aspect, we use the RandTopo for illustration
purposes. We first vary the network size from 30 to 100 nodes,
while keeping the mean node degree fixed at 5. Table III
summarizes the number of SLA violations as the number of
nodes varies. Next, we carry out a symmetric investigation
where the number of nodes is kept constant at 30, and the
number of links is increased by varying the average node
degree from 4 to 8. The results are displayed in Table IV. The
average link utilization is roughly 0.43 across all topologies
under normal conditions. In the tables, “R” and “NR” denote
robust and regular optimizations respectively.
We find that the benefits of robust optimization persist or
even increase as the network grows, whether by increasing
the number of nodes or by increasing the average node
degree. This is in part because larger networks typically offer
greater path diversity and hence more alternate paths can be
explored and leveraged by robust optimization. Furthermore,
the greater network size does not preclude regular optimization
from making locally bad decisions, e.g., by re-routing delay-
sensitive traffic over congested links in the presence of failures;
hence triggering SLA violations.
TABLE III
SLA VIOLATIONS IN RANDTOPO (DIFFERENT NETWORK SIZES).
Size 30 nodes 50 nodes 100 nodes
R NR R NR R NR
Average 1.41 5.95 1.63 23.35 2.25 30.62
(0.18) (1.32) (0.11) (8.39) (0.23) (9.25)
Top-10% 7.88 33.20 12.26 177.03 25.01 339.10
(1.72) (11.31) (1.14) (67.11) (2.36) (77.03)
TABLE IV
SLA VIOLATIONS IN 30-NODE RANDTOPO (DIFFERENT MEAN DEGREES).
Mean node degree 4 6 8
R NR R NR R NR
Average 1.88 6.80 0.99 23.32 0.87 23.16
(0.33) (1.15) (0.15) (8.07) (0.52) (5.16)
Top-10% 7.83 31.40 5.92 139.01 7.44 132.94
(2.25) (7.91) (0.70) (27.28) (2.16) (21.92)
D. Effect of network load
Next, we investigate how network load affects the benefits
of robust optimization. As mentioned earlier, higher link loads
can reduce path diversity in the network. This is because when
network load increases, queueing delay eventually becomes
significant enough to reduce the number of alternate paths
that can accommodate delay-sensitive traffic without SLA
violations after a failure. The question is then whether enough
alternate paths remain for robust optimization to discover and
use, so as to offer meaningful improvements. In order to
explore this issue, we take a 30-node, 180-link RandTopo as a
representative example that in the absence of congestion offers
a reasonable level of path diversity. We consider two levels of
network load: medium and high, with maximum link utiliza-
tion of 0.74 and 0.9, respectively, under normal conditions.
In robust optimization for the highly-loaded network, we set
|Ec|/|E| = 0.25 to achieve better accuracy of the critical
search.
Fig. 5(a) shows the number of SLA violations across all
single link failures, with and without robust optimization. As
network load increases, the higher link loads and associated
higher queueing delays result in more paths with end-to-end
delays at or close to the SLA bound. Thus, the lesser delay
margins on many paths translate into more SLA violations af-
ter link failures, irrespective of whether robust optimization is
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TABLE V
SLA VIOLATIONS IN RANDTOPO AS A FUNCTION OF SLA BOUND.
SLA bound (ms) 25 30 45 60 100
Regular optimization
Average SLA violations 23.32 19.34 26.75 31.70 33.72(8.07) (9.34) (9.48) (4.29) (5.39)
Average link utilization 0.44 0.46 0.48 0.49 0.50
Average max utilization 0.65 0.67 0.79 0.85 0.91
Robust optimization
Average SLA violations 0.99 0.62 0.57 0.33 0.06(0.15) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
Average link utilization 0.43 0.45 0.46 0.48 0.49
Average max utilization 0.56 0.60 0.64 0.65 0.72
used or not. In spite of this, we see that robust optimization still
yields substantial improvements in minimizing SLA violations
even at high loads. This indicates that at least in topologies
with adequate path diversity, robust optimization is still able
to identify enough alternate paths to ensure robustness by
allowing traffic to be redistributed on those paths in the
presence of failures.
E. Effect of SLA delay constraint
In this section, we address the question of whether and
to what extent robustness is achievable simply by relaxing
SLA delay bounds. In other words, is robust optimization
useful only under the assumption of “tight” delay constraints?
The results demonstrate that a looser SLA bound alone is
not sufficient to ensure greater robustness to failures. As a
matter of fact and somewhat counter-intuitively, it may make
matters worse and actually strengthen the benefits of robust
optimization.
We illustrate this using a 30-node, 180-link RandTopo as
an example14. Table V shows the number of SLA violations
under both regular and robust optimizations for different SLA
bounds. Robust optimization consistently yields a significantly
smaller number of SLA violations than regular optimization,
even for loose SLA bounds. As a matter of fact, a looser SLA
bound often results in more SLA violations under regular op-
timization. Both results, though not immediately intuitive, can
be explained. Recall that the relative insensitivity to failures
of robust optimization stems primarily from its selection of
paths that are slightly sub-optimal under normal conditions,
but capable of preserving performance in the presence of
failures. Because of their sub-optimality, those paths are never
considered by regular optimization. Hence, the benefits of
robust optimization are primarily a reflection of its ability
to consider a different (broader) set of paths than regular
optimization. As long as this difference remains, so will these
benefits. Consider now the effect of relaxing the SLA bound.
A looser SLA bound means that more paths are eligible for
routing delay-sensitive traffic. This in turn results in new path
choices for improving the performance of throughput-sensitive
traffic. However, it does little to change the fact that regular
optimization will still not consider the sub-optimal paths that
robust optimization does. In other words, both optimizations
have more paths to choose from, but the differences in their
choices remain.
14Its maximum end-to-end propagation delay was fixed to 25ms.
The reason behind the increased number of SLA violations
under regular optimization in RandTopo as the SLA bound is
relaxed is explored further in Fig. 5(b). The figure plots the
distribution of end-to-end delays in the absence of failures
for delay-sensitive traffic under regular optimization. The
results suggest that as the SLA bound is relaxed, the end-to-
end delays of delay-sensitive traffic increase commensurately.
Hence, the number of flows close to the SLA bound and,
therefore, at risk of violating it after a failure, remains roughly
constant. In other words, the relaxation of the SLA bound is
not used to improve the “failure-tolerance margin” of delay-
sensitive flows, i.e., increase the amount of additional delay
they can tolerate after a failure. In addition, the ability to
consider longer paths for delay-sensitive traffic to improve
the performance of throughput-sensitive traffic increases link
utilization (see Fig. 5(d) and Table V, where both the average
link utilization of the network and the average maximum link
utilization experienced by each SD pair on its path under
normal conditions are reported). The average link utilization
measures the global increase in link load produced by allowing
delay-sensitive traffic to use longer paths, while the average
maximum link utilization focuses on the effect on what is
likely to be the most problematic link for each SD pair, i.e.,
the most loaded link on that SD pair’s path. This makes it
more likely that after a failure, link loads, in particular on the
most loaded link, will exceed the level where queueing delays
become high enough to affect end-to-end delays. Hence, it
is more likely that delay-sensitive flows, whose end-to-end
delays are close to the SLA bound prior to a failure, will
experience SLA violations after a failure. This explains the
greater number of SLA violations under regular optimization
as reported in Table V for looser SLA bounds. Similar results
were also observed with the PLTopo and ISP topologies.
The previous results notwithstanding, there are cases where
a loose SLA bound lessens the benefits of robust optimization.
This typically occurs in networks with limited path diversity,
where robust optimization has little potential in the first place.
We illustrate this behavior using NearTopo which as discussed
earlier has limited path diversity at least when it comes to
crossing the network’s core. By relaxing the SLA bound from
25ms to 100ms in NearTopo, the average number of SLA
violations across all single link failures is decreased from 40
to 8 when regular optimization is used. In the mean time, the
average link utilization is around 0.38 when relaxing the SLA
bound. This observation is different from RandTopo (Table V)
due to the limited path diversity in NearTopo. Because of this,
relaxing the SLA bound does not trigger the exploration of
longer paths (with more links), which could in turn result in
higher link loads. Instead, as shown in Fig. 5(c), although end-
to-end delays grow somewhat15 as the SLA bound is relaxed,
this growth is less marked than in RandTopo.
15This growth is partly caused by assigning a queueing delay of zero as
long as link load is below a certain threshold. This favors keeping the load
of a few links below this threshold to give flows using them a better chance
to meet the SLA target, even if it results in other links being more heavily
loaded. As the SLA bound increases, this incentive disappears and flows are
distributed more evenly across links, with more links now above the load
threshold even if the average remains constant.
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Fig. 5. (a) SLA violations in medium- and highly-loaded networks. (b) and (c) End-to-end delays across SD pairs in the absence of failures under regular
optimization in RandTopo and NearTopo respectively. (d) Max utilization of links carrying delay-sensitive traffic in RandTopo under regular optimization.
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Fig. 6. (a) and (b) Network performance under the random traffic fluctuation model. (c) and (d) Network performance under the download hot-spot model.
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Fig. 7. (a) and (b) Network performance under all single node failures. (c) and (d) Network performance under all single link failures.
In summary, the conclusion that relaxing SLA bounds is
not a substitute for robust optimization is valid, but only in
topologies where robust optimization is effective in the first
place.
F. Sensitivity to uncertainties
The last aspect of our evaluation deals with the sensitivity
of the routing solutions we produce to uncertainty in the
inputs used to compute them. In particular, we examine their
benefits when traffic patterns and loads differ from those used
to compute them, and in the face of node failures as opposed
to single link failures16.
As alluded to at the beginning of Section V, traffic matrices
are usually derived from combining and averaging a broad
range of measurements. As a result, traffic matrices cannot be
assumed to be accurate estimates of the actual traffic flowing
16As we shall see, even if routing solutions computed to be robust against
single link failures do not perform as well as solutions computed specifically
for node failures, they still outperform routings that are oblivious to failures
and simply seek to optimize performance under normal operating conditions.
This outcome was also observed for other types of failure patterns, e.g.,
multiple link failures. It establishes that robustness to single failures is not
realized through an increased fragility to other failure types.
through a network at a particular point in time. In addition
to averaging and measurement inaccuracies, external factors,
e.g., flash crowds, BGP route changes, etc., can also contribute
significant discrepancies between actual traffic and the traffic
matrices used for optimization. The question is whether this
affects the effectiveness of robust optimization.
Let RD and RT denote the delay- and throughput-sensitive
base traffic matrices used by the optimization, respectively,
and R˜D = [r˜D(s, t)] and R˜T = [r˜T (s, t)] the traffic matrices
representing the actual traffic carried by the network. In inves-
tigating the impact of differences between RD and R˜D, and
RT and R˜T , we focus on two types of traffic uncertainties. The
first emulates measurement errors and random fluctuations in
traffic intensities. The second targets traffic variations caused
by sporadic incidents that affect the traffic sunk or sourced by
a few nodes.
To capture random fluctuations in the intensity of traffic
between individual SD pairs, we rely on a Gaussian model
that has been shown appropriate in modeling such estimation
errors [6], [18]. This gives actual traffic intensities of the
form: r˜D(s, t) = rD(s, t) + N (0, εrD (s, t)) and r˜T (s, t) =
rT (s, t)+N (0, εrT (s, t)) where N (0, σ) denotes a normally
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distributed random variable with zero mean and standard
deviation σ. ε controls the magnitude of possible traffic
fluctuations. For example, with ε = 0.2, the actual traffic
intensities can fluctuate by ±40% around the estimated mean
value with a likelihood of about 95%.
The impact of sporadic incidents is captured by using a
hot-spot model that allows traffic surges to (upload) or from
(download) a small set of (server) nodes. The hot-spot model
involves selecting a small set of server nodes, assigning a
number of “clients” to each one of them, and scaling the traffic
intensities of the corresponding SD pairs by a factor greater
than one. Specifically, in the upload scenario, assuming that
client i is assigned to server j, the corresponding traffic inten-
sities are r˜D(i, j) = νi,jrD (i, j) and r˜T (i, j) = µi,jrT (i, j)
for the delay- and throughput-sensitive traffic, respectively,
where νi,j > 1 and µi,j > 1. Similarly, in the download
scenario, r˜D(j, i) and r˜T (j, i) are set to νj,irD (j, i) and
µj,irT (j, i), respectively.
We illustrate the sensitivity of routing solutions to the ran-
dom fluctuation and download hot-spot models in Fig. 6 using
a 30-node, 180-link RandTopo. Similar results for the upload
hot-spot model were obtained and can be found in [14]. In the
random fluctuation scenario, we used base traffic matrices for
which robust optimization produced 90% maximum link uti-
lization under normal conditions. ε = 0.2 was used to generate
traffic fluctuation. In the download hot-spot scenario, we used
base traffic matrices for which robust optimization produced
74% maximum link utilization under normal situations. We
randomly selected 10% of the nodes as servers and 50% of
nodes as clients, and νj,i and µj,i were uniformly distributed
between 2 and 6, i.e., the traffic volume could increase by 100-
500% for those SD pairs. In each model, 100 testing instances
were randomly generated. The figures focus on the top-10%
worst failures to magnify possible differences. The vertical
bars in the figures denote the standard deviations among the
100 testing instances. The main conclusions are that (i) the
benefits of robust optimization remain even with reasonably
large deviations between estimated and actual traffic matrices,
i.e., robust optimization still performs much better in the face
of failures; (ii) Computing a routing robust to failures appears
to also afford some level of robustness against unexpected
traffic fluctuations, i.e., routing performance is roughly equal
for the estimated and actual traffic matrices.
Next, we investigate the benefits of robust routing in dealing
with single node failures; a failure pattern that was not ac-
counted for in the optimization. As discussed earlier, although
node failures are less common than link failures, they can arise
in the presence of malfunctions that affect an entire router,
e.g., overload or software bug. The investigation compares
the performance of three routings in the face of all possible
single node failures, where the failure of a node triggers the
failure of all its links as well as the removal of all the traffic
it originates. The three routings under comparison include a
standard routing that seeks to optimize performance under
normal conditions, our robust routing solution that considers
all possible single link failures, and a robust routing solution
that explicitly targets node failures. This latter solution is
computed using what is essentially an “exhaustive” heuristic,
which is computationally feasible in the case of node failures
because of the smaller (linear) number of failure patterns under
consideration.
For illustration purposes, we show the results for a 30-node,
180-link RandTopo. The traffic matrix produces roughly 80%
maximum link utilization under normal conditions. We use the
same set of parameters to optimize routing against all single
link and all single node failures, and allow the throughput-
sensitive traffic cost under normal conditions to be relaxed by
at most 20% in exchange for robustness to failures. Figs. 7(a)
and 7(b) summarize the results for delay- and throughput-
sensitive traffic, and display network performance for each
routing under the node failure scenario. As expected, although
a routing optimized specifically for node failures outperforms
a routing computed to handle single link failures, the latter still
vastly outperforms a routing that is oblivious to failures. This
is especially so for delay-sensitive traffic. This indicates that
robust optimization, as defined in this paper, i.e., to account
for all single link failures, is not realized at the cost of greater
fragility to other failure patterns and can actually mitigate the
effect of a wide range of failure scenarios.
Conversely, while a routing optimized for node failures
is successful at protecting against such failures, it is no
replacement for a routing explicitly aimed at single link
failures in terms of offering robust performance against those
more common failure patterns. This is illustrated in Figs. 7(c)
and 7(d), which show that a routing optimized for node failures
can perform very poorly for certain link failure scenarios. This
was observed across several topologies and traffic patterns. In
other words, producing a routing that performs well against all
single link failures cannot be realized by optimizing routing
to only withstand node failures. Effectively handling such
scenarios calls for using the robust optimization procedure
introduced in this paper.
VI. CONCLUSION
The paper explored the extent to which DTR-based solutions
can offer both flexibility in supporting multiple traffic types,
and robustness to failures. In carrying out this exploration,
the paper develops a novel insight and methodology for
identifying links that are critical to routing performance,
thereby making the task of computing a robust routing feasible.
The paper demonstrates that flexibility and robustness can be
jointly realized across a broad range of topologies and traffic
patterns. It also demonstrates that those benefits are relatively
insensitive to variations in traffic patterns and loads, and to
some extent remain present in the face of other types of
failures. More importantly, they are not realized at the cost
of greater fragility to those failures.
There are several possible interesting extensions to this
work. For example, a probabilistic failure model can be
formulated as part of a robust optimization framework, and we
believe that the critical link technique developed in this paper
can be extended to that model as well. Another interesting
direction is to explore how to jointly design routing and
network topology to maximize robustness.
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